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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DRIFTER BLAKE NIBLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43128
Latah County Case No.
CR-2014-1570

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Nibler failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
vehicular manslaughter?

Nibler Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Nibler pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the district court imposed a
unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.102-11.) Nibler filed a notice
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.116-19.)
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Nibler asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his alcohol abuse, mental
health issues, purported remorse, and “lack of criminal intent or premeditation.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-9.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for vehicular manslaughter is 15 years. I.C. § 184007(3)(b). The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years
fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.102-11.) At sentencing,
the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and
also set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Nibler’s sentence. (Tr., p.29, L.9 – p.36,
L.17.) The state submits that Nibler has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for
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reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript,
which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Nibler’s conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 24th day of September, 2015.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of September, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
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And I think if you fix a term of three
2 years, that will give sufficient ability for the
Department of Corrections to determine if and when
Mr. Nibler's prepared to be back out in the
5 community, and hopefully they wouldn't do that until
6 he has a full understanding of the loss that he
7 caused, and that he is not the victim here.
8
With respect to retaining jurisdiction,
9 that was our original recommendation, it's
10 concerning and problematic that Mr. Nibler did
11 violate the conditions of his release. Ultimately we
12 were originally going to ask for a sentence of 2 to
13 10, so I think changes in the sentence to 3 to 15
14 helps acknowledge and respond to the fact that
15 Mr. Nibler apparently isn't taking this as seriously
16 as he cou ld and he should. But I think that's a
17 sufficient reaction to that. I don't think that
18 that so much weight should be put on that that that
19 should cause him to go directly to serving his
20 sentence without the Court retaining jurisdiction.
21
I certainly understand that's in your
22 discretion, Judge, and I know there is a lot -- a
23 lot here. We have great harm, we have a fairly poor
24 criminal history, it's not as bad as some certainly;
but when you have got a prior DUI, that's just
1

doesn't bode well for you if you later end up being
2 DUI and causing someone's death.
3
So, again, Judge, we ask that you sentence
4 him to the 3 to 15 yea rs and retain jurisdiction.
5 We do believe that is appropriate in this matter.
6 Thankyou.
7
TI-IE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cavanaugh.
8
Anything in response, Ms. Rouse?
9
MS. ROUSE: Just briefly, your Honor. And
10 based on my interactions with Mr. Nibler and just
11
his family this morning, I'd like to say that I
12 think before he can a ppreciate fully the depth of
13 the effect of what happened, he has to appreciate
14 fully his mental health and his substance abuse
15 issues. And I think that he is prepared to begin
16 that journey of understanding himself, and he is
17 prepared to accept and acknowledge the fact that he
18 does need some treatment and some programing.
19
He has s tated to me that he does want
20 programing. He wants to change who he is because of
21
what has happened. And, again, I think in order for
22 him to fully appreciate and be able to express his
23 remorse that I do believe he has, he has to work
24 through some other layers of himself first. And I
25 believe that given the opportuni for a retained
1
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jurisdiction and the therapeutic community, that he
would be able to be successful on that journey.
Thank you.
TI-IE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Rouse.
Does the Defendant have any lawful cause
lo show why sentence should not be imposed at this
time?
MS. ROUSE: No, your Honor.
TI-IE COURT: As Mr. Cavanaugh mentioned,
the statute that I'm to apply is 19-2521 that sets
out the criteria for placing a defendant on
probation or imposing imprisonment.
In the first set of criteria state the
Court shall deal with the person who has been
convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of
imprisonment, unless having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the history,
character and condition of the defendant. It is of
the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for
protection of the public because the first criteria
is one that there is undue risk that during the
period of a suspended sentence or probation, the
defendant will commit another crime.
It has been acknowledged Mr. Nibler was
doing things that he had been ordered not to do
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during his period of release, and I think that's an
aggravating factor as far as whether during the
period of a suspended sentence he would be likely to
commit another crime having done what he's been told
not to do while on release. I think that's a
predictor of him again committing another crime were
I to suspend his sentence.
The next criteria is that the defendant is
need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by the commitment to an
institution. And I do, in fact, find that that
criteria has been met.
The next criteria is that a lesser
sentence w ill depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime. As Mr. Cavanaugh aptly pointed
out, this caused the death Mr. Solberg, and that is,
I think, coloring my view as to the seriousness and
whether this would - whether a suspended sentence
or placing the defendant on probation would
depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime,
and I think that it would.
The next criteria is that imprisonment
will provide appropriate punishment and deterrence
to the defendant. I can and do find that that
criteria has been met.
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The next criteria is that imprisonment
will provide an appropriate deterrent for other
persons in the community. I likewise find that that
criteria has been met.
The final criteria under that section is
5
6 that the Defendant is a multiple offender or
7 professional criminal. Well, I don't find that
8 Mr. Nibler is a professional criminal; I do find
9 that he has had other offenses which should have
10 given him pause to commit the crime that he
11 committed.
The next set of criteria are set out as
12
13 grounds while not controlling the discretion of the
14 court, shall be a accorded weight in favor of
15 avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. The first
1G criteria is that the defendant's criminal conduct
17 neither caused, nor threatened harmed. Obviously I
18 can't find that that criteria has been met since
19 Mr. Solberg is no longer with us as a result of
20 Mr. Nibler's actions.
21
The next criteria is that the Defendant
22 d id not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
23 cause or threaten harm. It's a more troublesome or
24 difficult criteria to analyze since it's very
5 difficult to climb into somebody's mind, but I think
1
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various factors suggest to me that whether he did
contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten harm, he certainly should have recognized
that his criminal conduct would have caused this
harm. We know four hours after the accident that
Mr. Nibler's blood alcohol content was .14 which is
almost twice what the legal limit is in the state;
and given the dissipation of alcohol in one's system
through the normal rate of metabolism, I think we
can extrapolate that Mr. Nibler's blood alcohol
content was significantly greater than .14 when
Mr. Solberg was run over.
There was also a headlight out. And
while, Ms. Rouse, you suggested that that's a
mitigating factor, I think that's an aggravating
factor. Here's somebody who is drunk, too much
alcohol, who is operating a vehicle that isn't
adequately equipped. Perhaps if the headlight had
been working, this accident might never have
happened. So I think that's an aggravating factor
as opposed to a mitigating factor.
And, finally, Mr. Nibler didn't have
driving privileges on the night in question. So
here's someone who is drunk too much, driving a
poorly equipped vehicle, and doesn't have the lawful
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criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was
sustained. Clearly I can't find that that can or
will be made, that that compensation can or will be
made. Obviously when a life is lost, it's
irretrievable.
The next criteria is that the defendant
7 has no history of prior delinquency or criminal
8 activity or has led a law abiding life for a
9 substantial period of time before the commission of
10 the present crime; I can't find that that criteria
11 has been met.
The next criteria is that the defendant's
12
13 criminal conduct was the result of circumstances
14 unlikely to recur; I can't find that that criteria
15 has been met.
And finally the character and attitudes of
16
17 the defendant indicate that the commission of
18 another crime is unlikely; I also cannot find that
19 that criteria has been met.
So analyzing the criteria that I'm obliged
20
21 to analyze as set out in 19-2521, I find that a term
22 of imprisonment is a more appropriate sentence than
23 either suspending a sentence or placing Mr. Nibler
24 on probation.
25
The next criteria -- or the next

ability to drive, so I can't, as I say, get into the
mind of Mr. Nibler, but I can certainly say that he
should have contemplated that his conduct would have
caused or threatened harm not just in Mr. Solberg
but to others.
The next criteria is that the defendant
acted under a strong provocation; I certainly can't
find that that criteria has been met.
The next criteria is that there were
substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the
defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to
establish a defense; I clearly can't find that has
been met.
I also want to go back to those earlier
factors that I was talking about having drunk too
much, driving in a poorly equipped vehicle, and
driving without privileges. I think the rate of
speed was higher than what he should have been
traveling and what was lawfully allowed at the time.
The next criteria is that the victim of
the defendant's criminal conduct induced or
facilitated the commission of the crime; I obviously
can't find that that has been met.
The next criteria is that the defendant
has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
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obligation that I have is to determine an
appropriate sentence. The original sentence
contemplated in the Rule 11 Agreement was a sentence
of not less than two, nor more than ten years in the
state penitentiary with the Court retaining
jurisdiction. That means that Mr. Nibler would go
on a rider, and I would know in three to nine months
whether the powers that be at at the correctional
system think that he would be an appropriate
candidate for probation. We all know that that
agreement is no longer binding on me because of
Mr. Nibler's actions in the interim.
So the question I'm faced with is what is
an appropriate sentence. Mr. Cavanaugh suggested
that three to fifteen would be appropriate and
retaining jurisdiction. I actually think that two
to ten is an appropriate sentence, and I'm imposing
a sentence the not less than two nor more than ten
years in the state penitentiary.
The real question is whether to retain
jurisdiction. I think it would under the
circumstances depreciate the seriousness of the
offense by retaining jurisdiction, so I am declining
to retain jurisdiction.
So that means, Mr. Nibler, that you are
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facing two years minimum and eight years
indeterminate. In a very real sense how you perform
will determine when you will be eligible for parole.
I recommend that you seek to participate in the
therapeutic community and the pathways for success.
I can't control what the Department of Corrections
does with you, but I can tell you that you have a
serious alcohol problem and that serious alcohol
problem has resulted in the death of Olai Solberg.
So unless and until you get your alcohol problem
under control, I think you will likely be in the
penitentiary for a significant period of time.
I acknowledge that this was a tragic
accident, but I also acknowledge that there were
significant factors that you had control over that
led to this tragic accident; and had you acted
differently, we would not be here today.
A wise man once said, not even God can
change yesterday. We can't change our yesterdays.
We can't change what we have done, but we can change
our future. And my hope is that you will go, you
will learn from this and that you will change. Good
luck
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
THE COURT: It's also my obligation to
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advise you tha t you have the right to appeal this
decision. If you cannot afford counsel, one can and
will be appointed for you in the bringing of that
appeal.
The Defendant is remanded to the custody
of the Latah County Sheriff for imposition of the
sentence.
Is there anything else we need to take up?
MR CAVANAUGH: Judge, I did have a couple
more things.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CAVANAUGH: One, if you could
address -THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm suspending
your driving privileges for five years upon your
release from the penitentiary, Mr. Nibler. I am
leaving restitution open; however, I am imposing
restitution for the crime victim's compensation fund
in the amount $2,813.79. I'm also imposing a civil
fine of $5,000 payable to Mr. Solberg's mother.
Other things, Mr. Cavanaugh?
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MS. ROUSE: Judge, is there going to be any
criminal fine and any court costs? I'm not seeking
a criminal fine, I just am asking.
THE COURT: I'm imposing court costs, but
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1 don't know what those are just yet, $270.50 in

court costs are imposed. I'm also establishing a
priority for the restitution to Mr. Solberg's mother
and the civil penalty for Mr. Solberg's mother that
those will be paid before restitution to the crime
victim's compensation at the Industrial Commission.
MR.CAVANAUGH: The other couple of
administrative things, I guess, Judge, we do ask
that you order DNA sample and thumb print
impression.
THE COURT: Any objection, Ms. Rouse?
MS. ROUSE: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: And I am signing that.
Anything else, Mr. Cavanaugh?
MR. CAVANAUGH: Judge, we move to d ismiss
Count II, the Driving Without Privileges count.
T HE COURT: Hearing no objection, that
request is granted.
Anything else, Ms. Rouse?
MS. ROUSE: No, your Honor. Thank you very
much.
THE COURT: We are in recess.
Good luck, Mr. Nibler.
(Hearing concluded at 1:54 p.m.)

